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O

n 26 February 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair faced the largest
parliamentary rebellion in over a hundred years. Some 120 of his Labour Party colleagues voted against the government’s policy of support for
US military action against Iraq. Earlier that month, more than one million
people had taken to the streets of London to protest against the prospect of
war, while respondents to a UK Internet poll had voted America the country
that posed the greatest threat to world peace. The UK’s major partners in
Europe—France and Germany—also opposed Britain’s stance, the government having singularly failed in its self-appointed role of providing a bridge
of understanding between Europe and the United States. Prime Minister Blair
faced personal attacks in the media, being frequently portrayed as America’s
lap dog; even Nelson Mandela referred to him disapprovingly as the foreign
minister of the United States. The Prime Minister’s political survival itself
seemed to be at stake.
In the face of such pressures, it would have been understandable if
the British government had taken a less determined position on Iraq. In spite
of the oft-touted “special relationship,” British and American governments
have not always seen eye-to-eye during international crises. But that was not
the case. Notwithstanding dissension and resignations from his Cabinet,
Prime Minister Blair’s advocacy of the Bush Administration’s hard line on
Iraq hardly wavered, diplomatic support remained constant and vigorous,
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and Britain was the only American ally to make a sizable military contribution to the campaign. It is not surprising then that Tony Blair has been hailed
as a hero in the United States, becoming the first Briton since Winston Churchill to be nominated for a Congressional Gold Medal.
Blair’s firm leadership was critical to sustaining the British government’s support for US policy in Iraq. For some commentators, the Prime Minister’s resolve demonstrated principled, international statesmanship; to others
it displayed a naïve faith in American virtue. Regardless, foreign policy in a
parliamentary democracy is rarely made at the whim of even a powerful personality like Tony Blair.1 There are many factors beside Blair’s leadership that
helped to shape the government’s thinking. These included the long-standing
special Anglo-American relationship, an institutionalized habit of security cooperation between the two countries, an ambitious perception of Britain’s role
in the modern world, and an apparently genuine conviction that Saddam
Hussein’s regime posed a threat to national security. This article addresses
these issues and places them in historical context. It also draws conclusions
about the British government’s support for US policy on Iraq and its significance for Anglo-American relations in the medium term.

A Special Relationship
The partnership between the United States and United Kingdom has
been described as “a relationship rooted in common history, common values,
and common interests around the globe.”2 It has been become a journalistic
cliché to refer to this as a “special relationship,” but such a description has
been in common usage since first coined by Winston Churchill during his famous “Iron Curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. The close diplomatic and military relationship between the UK and the United States had its
origins in the strategic partnership of the Second World War. It was sustained
by common security concerns throughout the Cold War, and was revived in
the 1990s by a mutual recognition of the need to cooperate against new threats
to international peace and stability. After 9/11, Prime Minister Blair’s proactive role in the war against terrorism and his strong, supportive line on Iraq
brought new vigor to the Anglo-American partnership. On a visit to Britain in
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May 2003, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, not a notable Anglophile, exclaimed, “The special relationship between the US and the UK is
stronger than ever, and Americans are the better for it.”3
Some would argue, like Churchill, that shared history, common values, language, and legal traditions are enduring factors that alone are enough to
sustain a particularly close bond between the two countries.4 There is no question that language and cultural factors, as well as deep and well-established
social and intellectual connections, ease the process of Anglo-American relations. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to take cooperation for granted, as British and American interests have not always coincided. Before 1939, the
relationship was clouded by commercial and naval rivalries. Some US leaders
and commentators continued to harbor suspicions about British imperialism
until well after World War II. Even at the height of the Cold War, there were international crises where British and American priorities and policies diverged,
notably over Suez, Vietnam, the Yom Kippur War, and Grenada. More recently,
disagreements between the Clinton and Major governments over policy in
Bosnia and Northern Ireland in the early 1990s seemed to reinforce a perception that the special relationship between the two states had not survived the
downfall of the Soviet Union.5
Despite being nurtured by political elites on both sides of the Atlantic,
the concept of a special relationship with the UK is of little relevance or interest
to most Americans. It is rarely a topic raised or discussed by the media or political analysts. British support for US foreign policy, if discussed at all, is largely
assumed. On the other side of the Atlantic, the special relationship generates
significant debate and is often a source of controversy, because an influential
minority of British politicians and commentators has never shared its government’s enthusiasm for especially close ties with the United States.

The Anglo-American Security Partnership
The term “special relationship” is most often associated with national
security policy, where national interests and geopolitical factors are far more
important than sentiment. Notwithstanding the examples of differences given
above, both countries have sought to sustain a partnership that has brought
many mutual, practical security benefits. Britain has proved to be America’s
most consistent and reliable global ally and friend, being a champion of American leadership in NATO, a strong “atlanticist” voice in the European Union,
and a largely unequivocal advocate of US strategic policies. Even after Prime
Minister Blair’s incoming Labour government enthusiastically embraced the
European Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1997, the Prime Minister
took pains to stress the continuing primacy of the transatlantic alliance. He
made the British position clear on numerous occasions, such as in the House of
Winter 2003-04
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“Britain has proved to be America’s most
consistent and reliable global ally and friend.”

Commons debate on the European Union Rapid Reaction Force in December
1999, when he stated that any such capability must remain “entirely knitted together with America on the key NATO issues.”6 Along with fellow Briton and
NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, Blair has been among a minority of
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic who have fought vigorously to maintain a
transatlantic strategic consensus. Critically, Britain’s willingness to back up
diplomatic support with troops on the ground has contrasted with the relative
inconstancy of the United States’ other traditional major European allies,
France and Germany. If the UK is perceived as having greater influence in
Washington on security issues than other European powers, its readiness to use
armed force in common cause with the United States remains a principal factor
in such leverage.
Given the power asymmetry between the two countries, the maintenance of a close security relationship has almost always been of greater concern in London than in Washington. Unlike France, the UK has long been
reconciled to US power and leadership. Successive generations of British
policymakers, unencumbered by concerns about Anglo-Saxon dominance,
have accepted the role of junior partner in order to sustain a relationship regarded as critical to national security. A close alliance with the United States
has remained the cornerstone of British foreign and security policy for more
than 70 years. It enabled Britain to weather the Nazi and Soviet threats to its
national survival and, by helping to sustain Britain’s influence in the world, it
eased the impact of Britain’s dramatic decline in power after 1945.
In the early 21st century, the United Kingdom is no longer strategically dependent on the United States. The direct military threats have gone, and
the retreat from empire has long since been completed. Britain is a member of
the European Union and, notwithstanding strong business and financial ties,
the United States is no longer the UK’s creditor. Nevertheless, there is no evidence to suggest that the British government would place the UK’s security relationship with its European allies above that of the United States. The strategic
defense reviews of 1998 and 2002 reinforced this standpoint, emphasizing
continued close cooperation with the United States as Britain’s principal ally.7
Uniquely in Europe, Britain is committed to the development of military
70
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“network-enabled capabilities” to remain technologically interoperable with
US forces.8 Prime Minister Blair expressed the reality of Britain’s commitment
somewhat starkly in a BBC interview on Iraq in September 2002 when he said
that Britain had to be prepared to pay a “blood price” to secure its special security partnership with the United States.9

Britain as a “Pivotal Power”
Like most previous British Prime Ministers, Labour or Conservative,
Blair has recognized that close collaboration with the United States requires
more than merely supportive rhetoric. A firm commitment to share the military
burden in pursuit of common interests affords the UK the potential to influence
American strategic thinking and assists Britain to continue to “punch above its
weight”10 in international affairs. Unlike most European countries, the UK still
regards itself as an “out of area” player with global interests. The UK has farflung economic ties, and the British political establishment and public retain
the appetite for a proactive foreign policy.11 Well before 9/11and the buildup
to war with Iraq, Blair confirmed this continuing commitment to an international role when he articulated his vision of the UK’s place in the world:
It is to use the strengths of our history to build our future not as a superpower but
as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future. Engaged, open, dynamic, a
partner and, where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence, that is where
Britain must be.12

It has remained an article of faith for Britain’s leaders that, although
no longer a superpower, the country is nevertheless more than just another
middle-ranking European nation. Blair’s confident assertion that Britain was a
“pivotal power” represented the latest attempt by a British Prime Minister to
define the country’s post-imperial role.13 In a variation on the theme, he told
British ambassadors in January 2003 that the UK should act as a “unifier” in
helping to establish a new global consensus based on shared values and norms,
operating through international institutions.14 To realize Blair’s ambition for
Britain requires the maintenance of close partnerships with both America and
the European Union and the role of trusted intermediary when disputes erupt
between the two. The Iraq crisis proved a serious test for Blair’s pretensions, as
British ministers shuttled back and forth between America and Europe and
vainly attempted to build a transatlantic consensus. Blair exploited his close relationship with President Bush to obtain a hearing in Washington for European
reservations about the wider impact in the Middle East of military action
against Iraq. Concurrently, he attempted to persuade his European colleagues
of the need for a robust stand against Saddam Hussein.15
Winter 2003-04

71

Blair and his colleagues also were anxious to counter the powerful figures within the US Administration that believed America should act
unilaterally. They found themselves on the weaker side in the internal debate
within the Bush Administration, siding with the “doves,” led by Colin
Powell, who sought international legitimacy for the exercise of American
power by channeling it through the UN.16 For Blair, the UN route offered
the prospect of building the international consensus for action that was central to British diplomacy. Despite spirited efforts, the British government
was ultimately unsuccessful, failing to preserve even a semblance of the
transatlantic unity so dear to generations of British leaders. Blair’s failure
also thwarted his aspirations to re-brand the UK as a pivotal power, leaving his country with little alternative but its perennial role as America’s
faithful ally.
However, short of the government’s fall, there was no prospect of
Britain abandoning the United States. Blair made it clear on numerous occasions that America should not have to confront security challenges alone that
were properly the responsibility of the whole international community.17 Besides, as noted above, the British government was anxious to contain the
unilateralist instincts of the Bush Administration. US unilateralism is perceived as a potential threat to Britain’s special security partnership and could
have wider, unpredictable international repercussions. Speaking in March
2003, the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, sounded almost apocalyptic
when he warned against the consequences of leaving the United States alone
to take military action against Iraq:
What I say to France and Germany and all my other European Union colleagues
is take care, because just as America helps to define and influence our politics
so what we do in Europe helps to define and influence American politics. We
will reap a whirlwind if we push the Americans into a unilateralist position in
which they are at the centre of this uni-polar world.18

Bush and Blair: The Odd Couple
Shared interests frequently make for common cause between the US
State Department and British Foreign Office. But the personal chemistry between the respective national leaders has traditionally mattered more for the
overall health of Anglo-American relations. While it is dangerous to oversimplify often complex personal and political interactions, the warmth of the bilateral relationship during the leadership of Churchill/Roosevelt, Macmillan/
Kennedy, and Thatcher/Reagan can be contrasted with the relative chill of the
Heath/Nixon and Major/Clinton eras. Personal friendships between leaders
during international crises can help to relieve the stresses and isolation of
72
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“US unilateralism is perceived as a potential
threat to Britain’s special security partnership.”

power. This was evidently the case when George Bush and Tony Blair became
fast friends in the wake of 9/11.
Blair’s unstinting support and solidarity were enormously appreciated by the White House. Nevertheless, the bond between the two leaders surprised many observers; unlike Reagan and Thatcher, the two were not natural
political allies.19 Bush is a right-wing Republican, with an uncompromising
approach to US national interests, while Blair is a liberal with internationalist
instincts, who remains a close friend of Bill Clinton. Commentators have
noted both men’s strong religious convictions and shared belief that an interventionist foreign policy can be used as a force for good in the world.20 But it
was Tony Blair’s willingness to back supportive diplomacy with military
force, in a just cause, that made the biggest impression on George Bush.
Blair was the European leader who rallied support for the NATO
bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and was America’s staunchest ally in the war in
Afghanistan. However, although Blair did not balk at the prospect of military
action against Iraq, neither he nor his ministers and close advisers actively
sought such an outcome. The British government contained no hard-liners to
partner the Bush Administration’s leading hawks. On the contrary, Blair’s personal and political preferences were for an international consensus for action,
one legitimized by international law, to force Saddam Hussein to cooperate unconditionally or stand down from power. He actively sought to persuade Bush
of the benefits of such an approach.
It is not clear the extent to which Tony Blair’s personal standing with
the President influenced US strategy, in particular Bush’s decision in September 2002 to seek UN backing for action against Iraq. Like his predecessors,
Blair hoped to exploit the UK’s status as America’s closest ally to gain influence in Washington. Britain’s vast experience of global diplomacy and its
ability to apply the techniques of “soft power,” are widely respected in the
United States.21 Yet it is rare for British diplomacy to have a direct impact on
American policy formulation, and there have always been limits to the influence of even the most highly regarded British Prime Ministers.
That said, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US/UK relationship became
closer than at any time in recent memory. Ivo Daalder of the Brookings InstiWinter 2003-04
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tution, commenting on this development, stated, “There is a different relationship than with any other country. This administration . . . looks to London
as a true ally in a common cause. It actually listens to London.”22 George Bush
was prepared to listen to Tony Blair in September 2002 when the latter advocated trying to secure UN Security Council backing for action against Iraq.
But it would be wrong to conclude that Blair’s views single-handedly swayed
the President. The State Department’s arguments and domestic political considerations appear to have carried greater weight in modifying Bush’s natural
inclination to favor the advice of hawks such as Vice President Cheney and
Secretary Rumsfeld.23 The Bush Administration was certainly opposed to
Blair’s attempt to obtain a second UN resolution in January 2003, believing
that all the authority needed to go to war with Iraq was already contained in
Resolution 1441, passed the previous November. Bush was persuaded to give
grudging backing to his closest ally, if only to help Blair placate domestic opposition to war.24 This was hardly a significant concession, as earlier, in September 2002, it appears that Tony Blair had pledged to George Bush privately
that he would go to war against Iraq if necessary, even if it proved impossible
to rally international support.25

The Custom of Anglo-American Security Cooperation
Blair’s pledge of military support was facilitated by an ingrained, institutionalized habit of cooperation in military planning and intelligencegathering that dated back to the Second World War. Robin Oakley, CNN’s
European Political Editor, has described Britain and the United States as “traditional and instinctive military allies.”26 Accommodation, consultation, and
cooperation have characterized relations at the working level, often operating
outside official channels and continuing through periods, such as Edward
Heath’s premiership in the early 1970s, when the Anglo-American relationship at a governmental level was particularly strained.27 During the Falklands
war in 1982, US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger even started to provide assistance from the Pentagon to British forces before support for the
United Kingdom had become official US policy.28
Since the UKUSA Agreement of 1948, the signals intelligence organizations of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
have been closely linked. Britain passes intelligence to the United States and
other English-speaking countries that it does not share with its European partners; members of the CIA and Canadian and Australian intelligence services
even attend the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee meetings on a regular basis.29 A former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, has
described the intelligence relationship between Britain and America as “as
close as it gets” between two independent, sovereign states.30 The war on ter74
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rorism reinforced an already tight relationship in the intelligence sphere, and
both countries freely exchanged information in making the case against Saddam Hussein—material from British sources being included in Colin Powell’s
briefing to the UN Security Council in February 2002. The postwar controversy about the accuracy of intelligence estimates of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities called into question the quality of
intelligence-gathering equally on both sides of the Atlantic.
The defense establishments of the two countries have what has been
described as a “familiar confidence”31 in their dealings with each other.
Giving oral evidence before the House of Commons Defence Committee after the Iraq war, the UK Secretary of Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, made the following comment about his relationship with Donald Rumsfeld:
Bear in mind that I would meet with the Defence Secretary in the United States
on a pretty regular basis even before Iraq was a direct and specific issue, so our
relationship goes back further than this particular context. We have always
been able to speak frankly and openly to each other and part of the reason for
that is that we do not disclose the contents of those conversations, but I can assure you that there was excellent co-ordination at every level between the Ministry of Defence and the Pentagon.32

Traditionally, such close cooperation was particularly true in the nuclear field. Even today, Britain’s Trident missiles are leased from the United
States, British scientists work on nuclear research programs in the United
States, and the UK’s nuclear forces are targeted in conformity with US strategic doctrine.33 However, since the end of the Cold War, Britain’s willingness
to employ its modest, if effective, power-projection capabilities in cooperation with the United States has resulted in ever closer military ties. Prior to the
attack on Iraq, one British official at the UK/US Joint Task Force headquarters in Qatar was quoted as saying that the two countries’ militaries were “as
tight as two coats of paint.”34 Another British officer quoted in The New York
Times stated, “There is no ally with whom we train more than the Americans,
and we are so comfortable with each other that we sometimes forget they are
there.”35 The close partnership between US and British marines was acknowledged when, for the first time since World War II, a substantial force of US
troops was placed under the command of the UK’s 3 Commando Brigade for
operations in southern Iraq.
British and US forces had worked together on military operations
against Iraq since 1990. The UK provided an armored division to the coalition
that liberated Kuwait, making a military contribution second only to the
United States. Britain also backed the United States in maintaining, and periodically enforcing, the “No Fly Zones” set up after the Gulf War. Well before
Winter 2003-04
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the formal invasion in March 2003, the Royal Air Force was engaged in
attacks on Iraqi air defenses, the Royal Navy was occupied with mineclearance operations in the northern part of the Persian Gulf, and British special forces were employed on stealth operations inside Iraq, often working
closely with their US counterparts. UK and US officers and officials were
jointly involved in planning for the war, building on integral, if not always
harmonious, staffing procedures and processes established during earlier operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.36
It is tempting to argue that the close relationship between the respective military establishments committed the British government to the use of
force against Iraq once military planning and coordination had begun in earnest in Autumn 2002. Certainly, by March 2003, with British troops deployed
and joint planning so well advanced, Prime Minister Blair would have lost all
credibility internationally and domestically had he pulled back from military
action after his failure to secure a second UN resolution. On the other hand,
while the British military contribution was undoubtedly welcomed by the
Bush Administration, there is little doubt that the operation could have been
mounted successfully without it. Secretary Rumsfeld simply stated the truth
when he announced at a Pentagon press conference in March 2003 that the
United States was prepared to go to war without the British.

Iraq as a Security Threat
A close security partnership with the United States remains a cornerstone of British foreign and defense policies. The Iraq crisis offered an opportunity to reinforce the UK’s credentials as a uniquely reliable ally, as well as
its status as Europe’s most significant diplomatic and military power on the
world stage. British support for the United States was undoubtedly facilitated
by the mutual admiration and rapport between Tony Blair and George Bush.
The customary practice of close intelligence and defense cooperation also
made it hard for Britain’s security establishment to stand aside.
Yet it would be mistaken to assume that British support for the US
hard line on Iraq was inevitable. Even before the buildup to war, there was
considerable disquiet in the UK over the Bush Administration’s actions on a
wide range of issues as diverse as the Kyoto Protocol and the International
Criminal Court. In the circumstances, more guarded backing for the United
States would have been understandable, especially as military action against
Iraq was widely viewed in the UK as the Bush Administration’s most contentious international policy to date. Significantly, Prime Minister Blair did not
hesitate to court domestic unpopularity by canvassing for solidarity with the
United States. However, to claim that Blair was motivated by an unquestioning loyalty to the United States would be naïve and unfair. No British govern76
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ment would have taken the country into a war of questionable legitimacy on
account of the “special relationship” alone. In the past, British governments
have distanced themselves from the United States when the short-term national interests of the two countries have diverged or clashed. This was not the
case with Iraq. The leadership in both countries shared a common perception
of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime and had a mutual interest
in countering it. The British government’s robust stance on Iraq went back
many years, fueled primarily by a suspicion that Saddam Hussein was continuing to develop WMD, a concern reinforced by his regime’s persistent refusal
to comply with the cease-fire conditions mandated after the Gulf War and its
unwillingness to cooperate unconditionally with UN weapons inspectors.
Even before 9/11, the United Kingdom regarded the problem of Iraq
as very high on the agenda of Anglo-American relations. Shortly after his appointment as Ambassador to the United States in 1997, Sir Christopher
Meyer stated that “the analysis of the British and American governments as to
what should be done is very close indeed. We react instinctively and politically and intellectually very similarly to the challenge that Saddam presents.”37 When Iraq blocked the work of UN weapons inspectors in 1998,
Tony Blair stressed the risks of allowing Saddam Hussein to possess WMD
and actively supported the use of US and UK airstrikes to enforce the UN’s
will. The joint press statement released after Blair’s first meeting with
George Bush in February 2001 also emphasized the determination of both
leaders to oppose the development and use of WMD by Iraq.38 Before 9/11, it
could be argued that it was the British who were forcing the pace for action
against Iraq, rather than the Americans.39
In the buildup to war, the threat from WMD was given particular
prominence by the British government. The Prime Minister’s foreword to the
Joint Intelligence Committee’s September 2002 dossier on Iraq claimed that
WMD represented “a current and serious threat to the UK’s national interests.”40 His statement to the House of Commons at the time developed this
theme and contained a warning of the dire consequences of ignoring the challenge from Saddam Hussein: “And if people say: why should Britain care? I
answer: because there is no way that this man, in this region above all regions,
could begin a conflict using such weapons and the consequences not engulf
the whole world.”41
Just prior to the war, the UK Foreign Secretary gave specific details
of Saddam Hussein’s perceived capabilities to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. The following statement summarized the government’s case for war: “Our assessment is that Iraq has the capability to produce
the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX, and the biological [agents] anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin. The Iraqi reWinter 2003-04
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“One British official . . . was quoted as
saying that the two countries’ militaries
were ‘as tight as two coats of paint.’”

gime has put up an elaborate screen of concealment based on intimidation and
deception.”42
Although the British government accepted that there was no evidence of a direct link between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al Qaeda, it expressed no doubt about the relationship between terrorism and WMD, as
Tony Blair made clear during a keynote speech in November 2002: “Terrorism and WMD are linked dangers. States which are failed, which repress their
people brutally, in which notions of democracy and the rule of law are alien,
share the same absence of rational boundaries to their actions as the terrorist.
Iraq has used WMD.”43
Blair was not the only British political leader with strong convictions about the danger posed by Saddam Hussein. Iain Duncan Smith, leader
of the Conservative Party, also shared the government’s view that Britain’s
national interests were directly affected. In his speech to the 2003 Conservative Spring Conference, he was even more strident than Blair regarding the
threat from Saddam Hussein: “He rails against us on a daily basis; please do
not pretend we are not a potential target, for I believe we are and if anybody
thinks otherwise, I am sorry but I think you are living in cloud cuckoo-land.
We are a legitimate target and will become one.”44
As a Prime Minister commanding a large parliamentary majority
and with Duncan Smith, the leader of the biggest opposition party also in favor of a hard line on Iraq, Tony Blair was in a stronger position to prepare for
war than evidence of widespread public unease and political opposition to his
policy at the time suggested.
The Joint Intelligence Committee’s dossier, referred to above, was
one of two published by Blair’s government in the months before the war
which purported to show that Saddam Hussein was actively developing and
hiding chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in defiance of UN resolutions. The pre-war intelligence reports generated considerable controversy
on both sides of the Atlantic after the fall of the regime, when investigation
failed to unearth evidence to validate their findings. There were accusations
that the Bush and Blair administrations had doctored the intelligence assess78
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ments to justify war by misrepresenting Iraq’s WMD program as a real and
present danger. However, like George Bush, Blair remained defiant in the
face of his critics, although his early, bullish confidence that WMD would be
found gave way over time to a more cautious assessment.45
The postwar investigation by the House of Commons Committee on
Foreign Affairs raised significant doubts about the validity of British government’s case for war and the way some intelligence data were presented and
handled. However, it did not question the sincerity of Tony Blair, his ministers,
or MI6 in believing that Iraq was actively pursuing the illegal development of
WMD before the war.46 In hindsight, Blair’s government probably placed too
much emphasis on the threat from WMD to justify military action against Iraq,
maybe because other arguments for removing Saddam Hussein were less tangible.47 However, given the severity of the military and political risks, not least
to Blair’s reputation domestically and internationally, it is hard not to conclude
that government policy was ultimately driven by a genuine conviction that
Saddam Hussein posed a real and continuing threat to Britain’s security.

Anglo-American Relations After the War in Iraq
The Iraq war left the reputation of Tony Blair and British diplomacy
bruised and battered, both domestically and internationally. The creditable
performance of the British armed forces aside, there was little solace for the
government in the quick military defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The
British government’s foreign policy ambitions had been thwarted, and relationships with European partners and the Muslim world undermined. Far
from bridging the gap between Europe and America, Britain’s attempts to engineer consensus and build a coalition for action had singularly failed. For the
United States, the UK had failed to deliver the major European powers; for
the Europeans, it had failed to act as a restraint on the Bush Administration.
Like other internationalists, including those in the US political establishment, Blair had hoped that Iraq might prove a model for how the world
community could cooperate to confront new security challenges in the 21st
century.48 Instead, the experience offered succor to the neoconservatives, already the dominant group within the Bush Administration, as the role played
by the UN and many traditional US allies in the run-up to war reinforced a perception that working through international institutions created unwarranted
constraints on American action. The damaging diplomatic exchanges before
the war left the Bush Administration as jaundiced with the UN as Clinton’s was
disillusioned with NATO following Operation Allied Force in 1999.
Common cause over the war against terrorism and Iraq created an artificially close relationship between Bush and Blair. As noted earlier, they are
far from ideological soul mates, and political differences were bound to resurWinter 2003-04
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face. In fact, these emerged even before the end of the war, over the postwar
role for the UN in Iraq and the Middle East peace process.49 While the chaos in
postwar Iraq may have blunted the neoconservatives’ appetite for fresh, unilateral foreign adventures, it is unlikely to bring them any closer to the Blair government’s position on issues such as the role of international institutions, the
environment, or world poverty. Only the return of a Democratic administration
might give Blair the chance to promote successfully his internationalist agenda
in Washington. He can trade on his popularity in the United States for a while,
but there seems little prospect of the British government having more than minimal influence as long as the neoconservatives hold sway.
Relations between the US and British governments may be set to
cool, although this does not spell the end of the special relationship, which as
always remains founded on continuing mutual, practical security benefits. It
is hard to imagine the disentangling of institutionalized defense and intelligence arrangements that have endured for so long. Nevertheless, at present
there is little in the way of a common transatlantic security assessment or
threat perception to reinvigorate the NATO alliance. The global war on terrorism and the threat from the proliferation of WMD have so far failed to generate the same sense of urgency in Europe as in the United States. And as
Europe has shrunk in strategic importance to the United States, the UK’s role
as chief lobbyist for an atlanticist agenda is much less vital than hitherto.
Over time, this development, coupled with the potential technological and
structural impact of US military transformation, may yet cause the special
US/UK security relationship to wither. This is not, however, inevitable. Efforts are being made on both sides of the Atlantic to limit the damage caused
to transatlantic relations by the Iraq war. NATO is finally starting to adapt to
the new security environment and even the EU may in future be prepared to
support robust action to address common Western security challenges that
transcend transatlantic rivalries and disagreements.50
As the efforts to rebuild Iraq have graphically illustrated, the United
States cannot carry the security burden alone. At the very least, it needs its European allies to contribute troops for peace support operations and resources
for nation-building. However, if European states want to be in a position to
influence the global strategic agenda, rather than having it dictated to them by
the United States, they will ultimately need to be able and willing to contribute a “hard” security capability. If the European Union and the United States
were to become true strategic partners, Britain would have a crucial role in facilitating revitalized military cooperation. The United Kingdom possesses
the only armed forces with the prospect of remaining interoperable with the
United States for the foreseeable future, while any serious attempt to build a
European power-projection capability would be reliant on British commit80
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ment and expertise. In these circumstances, the UK might yet be able to remain both a leading player in Europe and a special partner of the United States
and thus realize Prime Minister Blair’s vision of Britain as a pivotal power.
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